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This paper returns to Immanuel Kant's Lectures on Anthropology [1776-1800] in 
order to investigate Kant’s moral imperative in relation to the history and relevance of 
anthropology in the creation of our world society. The paper critically reproaches the 
universal ethics invested in Kantian philosophy in relation ethnographic writing. It highlights 
the paradox in Kant's anthropological project, which he ambiguously defined as a 
philosophical project placed in-between pragmatism and idealism, non-fiction and fiction, 
sense and silence. The chapter then argues that the inherited paradox in Kant's idealism 
enables the space for creativity invested in the potentiality for imagining and working 
towards a better world. Despite the recent rapid development of network technologies that 
has contributed to the creation of a world society, Kant's idealist transgression is undermined 
by the historical and everyday reality of the brutal process of globalization. The recent call in 
the study of Humanities for a revised return to Kant's teleological and moral imperative in 
relation to our increasingly unified, and yet, unequal world, demands a historical 
appropriation of anthropological discourse and the ethnographic practice, by raising historical 
self-awareness through the simultaneous development of personal aesthetics and universal 
poetics. By returning to the notion of authorship, the essay then argues that it is in this grey 
area, in-between history and imagination that anthropology could find its voice again. 
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Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology 
 Towards An Anthropology of Fiction 
The idea for establishing an anthropological discourse that focuses on fiction derives 
from the very foundation of modern anthropology as a way of thinking in and about the 
world. It was first introduced in a series of lectures by Immanuel Kant. The lectures were 
collected and combined between 1776 and 1780 in a volume entitled Lectures on 
Anthropology. In this series, Kant developed a pragmatic application of his greater project 
focusing on the study of human nature and the potential future of humanity as a whole. For 
Kant, the pragmatic study of anthropology promoted a variety of types of communication, 
including travelling, the exchange of ideas, tolerance, and the study of world novels, all of 
which would contribute in the development of a common understanding of our human nature. 
 
[…] while not exactly sources for anthropology, there are nevertheless aids: world history, 
biographies, even plays and novels. For although the latter two are not actually based on 
experience and truth, but only on invention, and while here the exaggeration of characters 
and situations in which human beings are placed is allowed, as if in a dream, thus 
appearing to show us nothing concerning knowledge of human beings –yet even so, in 
such characters as are sketched by a Richardson or a  Moliere, the main features must have 
been taken from observation of the real actions of human beings: for while they are 
exaggerated in degree, they must nevertheless correspond to human nature in kind [ Kant 
1798 section 7, paragraph 121 / 2007, 233] 
 
The Kantian anthropological project included two ways of travelling as the means of 
knowing the world: one refers to travelling in geographic places with occasional friends 
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(“human geography”), and the other to the study of morality and the potentiality of 
imagination. In achieving the connection between the self and the world, Kant promoted 
communication, the cultivation of self-awareness, the use of imagination, the exploration of 
our “inner sense” and “intuitive understanding” (intuitiver verstand), the study of fiction, and 
the practical application of universal ethics in everyday life (Kant 1798, paragraphs 119-121 / 
1978, 3-6). In both travelling and reading, Kant emphasized observation and self-reflection as 
the means of learning about our human nature, through our engagement with the world. 
A fictional play, or an artefact, is a mirror to the human soul. In the classic sense of 
Poetics, fictional accounts represent real situations in terms of mimesis (“imitation” of 
reality). The study of fiction ideally contributes to the cultivation of an intuitive 
understanding of the characteristics of human nature through the shared sense of empathy 
(“Einfuhlung”). This is further cultivated by travelling in physical or imaginative terms. 
Indeed, reading a novel, and nowadays, watching a film or using the web, offers an 
alternative and cheap way of travelling, one that uses our cognitive imagination and enhances 
our sense of self-awareness regarding our place in the world. In other words, reading is a way 
of moving around the world, as if we are travelling. This condition of constant movement 
enables the traveller-reader to change positions and perspectives, in order to develop a 
Copernican way of observing the world (Hart 2003 and 2004, and in this volume chapter 2). 
It follows that movement conforms to our curious urge to wander and to know the world, our 
wanderlust, which is the central motivation behind the anthropological practice of 
ethnography. This would enable the possibility of experiencing and understanding ourselves 
through the eyes of others. Our identification with the world requires our co-existence with 
others, their habits, history, and society.  By promoting the common characteristics of our 
shared human nature, the study of fiction would contribute to the development of a collective 
feeling of belonging to humanity as a whole (world citizenship) and help us understand 
5 
 
through the personal experiences and feelings we share with others what define us as 
“human”. 
Kant defined the term “anthropology” in reference to the pragmatic study of human 
nature. The study of anthropology was a practical application of Kant’s main body of work 
unfolded in his three major Critiques: the Critique of Pure Reason [1781/ 1788] that focused 
on the question of “what can I know”, which was followed by the Critique of Practical 
Reason [1788] that morally expanded in terms of “what I ought to know”, and the Critique of 
Judgement [1790] which reflected upon the question of “what may I hope”. He linked these 
simple questions to the study of human nature in terms of “what is man” and “what man 
makes”. In this context, the study of anthropology formed a complementary way of studying 
the metaphysics of human nature, in addition to the scientific study of the human body: 
“Physiological knowledge of man aims at the investigation of what Nature makes of man, 
whereas pragmatic knowledge aims at what man makes, can, or should make of himself as a 
freely acting being […]” (Kant 1978, 3 section 119). The physiological knowledge of human 
nature “is not yet pragmatic, but only theoretical knowledge of the world […] It is properly 
pragmatic only when it incorporates knowledge of Man as a citizen of the world”, and only 
when it contributes to the “knowledge of the world” (1978, 4 section 120). For Kant, 
“anthropology” was the pragmatic appropriation of his philosophy in the quest for “world 
cognition” [“Welterkenntuisse”], a term by which he referred to the knowledge of our world 
and our place in it. In this context, Kant set the anthropological way of thinking in-between 
the cognitive self (metaphysics) and the exterior world (geography), as a way of embracing 
our place in the world. The complementary study of human nature and human action formed 
the study of “pragmatic anthropology”, a Kantian term referring to a branch of practical 
philosophy, one that dialectically combined a moral and self-reflective journey inwards, 
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toward the creation of a better self (“what is man”), and outwards, towards the vision of a 
better world (“what man makes”).  
Therefore, Kant's anthropological project invested on the potentiality of personal 
imagination and creativity, both to be found in fictional and non-fictional accounts. He placed 
the anthropological vocation in-between non-fictional and fictional worlds as the means of 
fulfilling the greater responsibility of humanity to make a better world. The study of 
anthropology would contribute in the developing of a mutual understanding between nations 
and social classes, in order to achieve peace and equality according to the values of the 
Enlightenment. Above all, it is important to highlight that Kant's moral imperative was a 
political call, which was inspired by the writings of Rousseau on Freedom and Equality. Kant 
called for a historical and political awareness of our/selves in the world, and in relation to our 
fellow human beings. By placing the human being in the centre of the universe, the study of 
anthropology was thus a protégé of Renaissance thought, focusing on the human body and 
mind, as it was captured by Leonardo da Vinci in his portrait of the Vitruvian Man [c.1485]: a 
blend of art (sketch) and science (anatomy). 
 
The Crisis of the Intellectuals 
The introduction of new ocular technologies in Europe during the European 
Enlightenment, such as the microscope and telescope, radically changed the way of looking 
at nature and the universe. The new perception of the world was accompanied by a clear-cut 
separation of the arts from the science in terms of subjective and objective types of 
knowledge, respectively. This modern categorization of knowledge separated the irrational 
feelings and emotional sentiment of poets and artists, from the bureaucratic objectivity of 
numbers and scientific facts. The dichotomy deeply affected the development of 
anthropology. Under the pressure of becoming a “social science”, it called for a more 
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“scientific” approach to culture, society, economy, the human habitus, and the universe. But 
it also presented a particular problem to the anthropological method of investigation. As it 
was originally defined by Kant, the study of anthropology was based on travelling and 
participant observation. In other words, on personal experiences that took place in the grey 
area between subjectivity and objectivity, or what came to be known as the esoteric “self” 
and the “world” out there. In this sense, the study of anthropology was formed on a 
paradoxical discourse that combined two antithetical, and yet, complementary realms of 
experience: an understanding of the external world surrounding us through an introspective 
and internal struggle within, or even, against it. 
This ambiguity was deeply embedded in anthropological thought from its very 
conception as a discipline. It came to the surface in 1967, following the post-mortem 
publication of the fieldwork diaries of Bronislaw Kasper Malinowski from his two 
expeditions to the South Pacific that took place between 1914 and 1918. At the time, 
Malinowski was considered to be the father of professional anthropology. But the 
unauthorized publication of his private diaries in 1967 undermined his professional claims to 
scientific objectivity, which he had eagerly defended in the “Introduction” to the classic 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific [1922]. In the diaries, Malinowski often loses track of time 
and space, confusing familiar memories of Europe with the Pacific landscapes, in an overt 
state of self-narcissism and delusional nostalgia. The publication of the diaries exposed 
Malinowski's “confinement”, in the words of Raymond Firth (1967, 17) revealing his 
alienation from the social environment of the islanders because of his personal insecurities. 
Furthermore, Malinowski's detached method of observation suited to his paranoia and effort 
to stay away from “them”: “a crowd of savages […] by the light of bonfires” in his own 
words (1967, 27). His self-proclaimed authoritative position over the “informants” 
conveniently covered his own personal insecurities and fear of communication of a man 
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evidently lacking of, and desiring for, human touch. Instead, he functionally replaced his 
inability to communicate with the cold (i.e. “scientific”) perspective of the binoculars, which 
he used to observe and categorize the world from the narrow window of his cabin. His self-
imposed alienation was increased by an excessive consumption of painkillers and a shocking 
addiction to other manufactured drugs that resulted to his delusional state of mind. 
The post-mortem publication of Malinowski's diaries not only exposed the so-called 
“scientific” method of anthropology as a colonialist myth of the European world. Even more 
importantly, the post-mortem publication of the diaries opened the Aeolian bag, letting out 
processes that blew anthropology apart, dragging it into decades of deep self-examination. 
The “crisis of the intellectuals”, as it came to be known, brought on the surface questions 
regarding the profession of anthropology, the authority of the ethnographer in the field, the 
method of participant observation, the relationship of the ethnographer with the “informants”, 
in addition to methodological issues of representation, translation, and interpretation, all of 
which have since stigmatized the discipline (see Leach 1961, Needham 1970, Ardener 1971, 
Asad 1973, Bourdieu 1977, Marcus and Clifford 1986, Hammersley 1992, Grimshaw and 
Hart 1993 and 1995, da Col and Graeber 2011, among others). These issues further exposed 
an unbridgeable gap between anthropological theory and the ethnographic practice, enhanced 
by the interdisciplinary professionalization of anthropologists into other areas and 
disconnected discourses, which lacked a shared vocation, aim, or even a concrete 
methodology (Asad 1973). Furthermore, the crisis raised several ethical questions regarding 
the historical association of anthropology to colonialism and its relationship to history (Asad 
1993, Herzfeld 1987, and Tambiah 1990, among others). Anthropology had completely lost 
all its claims to objective representations of reality, as the rigid modernist dichotomy between 
the social scientist and the artist in terms of non-fictional and fictional types of knowledge 
had finally collapsed (Foster 1996, Gell 1998 and 2006). 
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Inevitably, anthropologists turned their interest in how ethnographic knowledge is 
produced in relation to exotic portrayals of the strange and untranslatable Cartesian Others in 
a variety of ways (see Fabian 1983, Needham 1984, Pratt 1986, Clifford 1988, Gell 1998, 
Herzfeld 2001, Katz and Csordas 2003, da Col and Graeber 2011). The practice of 
ethnography, which had been the source of the anthropological authority, was heavily 
questioned and criticized regarding its historical predicament and ethics. But as a result of the 
“crisis of the intellectuals”, the ethnographic scope opened up towards more subjective and 
self-reflexive forms of knowledge, often crossing the boundaries between the subjective and 
objective appropriations of the world. In this context, Clifford (1986 and 1988) famously 
highlighted the significance of allegory and the “poetic dimensions”, or “plural poesis”, of 
the genre of the ethnographic text. He further re-defined the experience of “fieldwork-ing” as 
a kind of individuating process of “self-fashioning”, referring to “the reconstitution of selves 
and others through specific exclusions, conventions, and discursive practices” (1988, 52, and 
in 1986, 24-26, and 98-121). In this semi-auto/biographical context, ethnography was seen as 
essentially a semi-fictional genre; the ethnographer as a traveling auteur; the monograph as a 
chronotope; the “world” as a text; and the ethnographic text as an incomplete “‘true fiction'”, 
a “system or economies of truth” (1986, 6-7). In the last decade, ethnographic texts are 
increasingly being seen as semi-fictions created by the charismatic minds (ethnographers or 
artists alike) of those who aspire to break away from the colonial past. Conversely, the 
reading of fictional texts invites for the active engagement of the readers to critically re-
evaluate their place in history through a process of self-reflection. This turn to subjectivity 
did not only undermine the claims of anthropology to science, but also resulted to the opening 
of the ethnographic scope towards the representation of everyday life in a self-reflective 
manner (as a poetic mimesis of reality).Seen in this light, ethnography was re-defined as a 
poetic representation of Otherness, similar to a painting or a play. This re-appropriation of the 
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ethnographic text returns to the original vocation of “anthropology”, as it was envisioned by 
Kant, referring to a pragmatic way of creating an equal free world. 
By returning to Kant’s anthropological thought, this essay examines the current turn 
to subjectivity as the means of understanding and engaging with global social and historical 
changes through storytelling. My aim is to re-examine the relationship between 
anthropological thinking and ethnographic representation, between thought and expression, in 
relation to this great historical moment: our technological transition to a new world society 
and engagement with a history-on-the-making. In doing so, the essay highlights the central 
paradox in Kantian anthropology, that is, Kant’s call for a pragmatic appropriation of an 
imagined better world, in order to examine it through the colonial legacy of the 
anthropological past, and the greater political paradox embedded in technological progress 
which envisions a technologically connected, and yet, increasingly unequal world society. In 
this context, the essay raises the question of the relevance of anthropological thought to 
history and the politics of a possible future for an equal world society. 
 
The Paradox of Kantian Anthropology 
In-Between Two Worlds 
Famously, in response to criticisms regarding his alleged “war” on science (physics) 
and emphasis on metaphysics, Kant had to revise the Preface to the first edition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason [1781] with a second Preface written in 1787. It is evident that he 
struggled to make it clear that his Critique was by no means an attack to scientific thought. 
Rather, he wished to morally examine the limits of science and scientific indifference, and 
vice versa, scientifically examined human morality in itself (see also Lindsay 1934, vii-xx). 
Consequently, Kant is not an idealist per se, but a critical idealist. The Kantian paradox was 
manifested in Kant’s struggle to define the relationship between metaphysics and science, 
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subjectivity and objectivity, respectively. This contradiction takes us directly to the central 
paradox in Kantian philosophy: in our case, how can we study fiction (aesthetics, mythology) 
in a pragmatic (scientific, historical) way? How can we imagine an ideal future in a 
pragmatic way? 
From a moral perspective, Kant’s critique of science as pure reason echoes Max 
Weber’s pair of essays entitled “Science as a Vocation” & “Politics as a Vocation” [1919] 
which were written more than a century later, following the madness of World War I. In 
them, the German sociologist questioned the industrial coldness of the machine gun giving 
nothing but anonymous and indifferent death. Weber wrote: “And because death is 
meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very ‘progressiveness’ it gives death 
the imprint of meaningless” (2009, 140). In the face of total war, Weber came to question the 
meaning of progressiveness, and through it, the use of new technologies without a moral self-
reflective or ethical stand, or interest for the fellow human being. Weber’s question is as 
relevant as ever in the world today. The increasing tensions between the local and the global, 
the particular and the universal, takes the form of politico-religious and socio-economic 
conflicts, irrational violence, endless wars, terrorism, micro-holocausts, and bloody 
revolutions, in which the human condition is often denigrated to a merely worthless sub-
existence; a meaningless number. It is true that new technologies make the world feel 
smaller, less strange and more familiarized, and yet, it feels more alienating and inhuman. 
From drone assassinations that diminish death to a TV game, to the dislocation and 
dismantling of traditional group units, new technologies confirm the elimination of human 
touch and human contact, replacing it with forms of detached communication through a cold 
computer screen, a mobile phone, or Skype.  
Max Weber’s general thesis regarding the process of rationalization and 
bureaucratization in modern times incorporated the gradual separation of what was thought to 
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be rational from irrational modes of activity (as in Tambiah’s reading of Weber, 1990, 153). 
The modernist dichotomy between the scientific and objectified world of nature and society, 
from the emotional and subjective world of the esoteric individual, deeply affected 
anthropology as it called for a more “scientific” approach to culture, society, economy, and 
the human habitat. The ethnographer became a “scientist”, obliged to keep an observant 
distance from his “subjects”/ “informants”, in order not to affect their actions and reactions 
within their “natural” environment. This distance from the “field” was enhanced by the 
invention of new optical technologies that radically changed the way we look at the world, 
such as the invention of the telescope, the microscope, and everyday objects such as the 
binoculars (as also in Arendt 1958/ 1998, 248). In this context, the term “ocular-centrism” 
came to refer to the central position given to the Observant Eye, symbolically placed in the 
centre of the Pyramid / Universe, and referring to the understanding of the universe through a 
certain way of supposedly objectified and scientific way of looking at nature and history (as 
in Levin 1993, 1-29, Tambiah, 1990, and Appadurai and Breckenridge 1995, among others). 
On this basis, fictional modes of production were distinguished from non-fictional ones, 
confirming the separation of human emotions and personal passions from the cold and 
observant perspective of science. This separation, however, contradicted the foundation of 
modernity on the basis of a blend of the arts with science, a priori emotions and a posteriori 
empiricism, respectively (see also introductory note to this volume, and Paganopoulos 2011 
and 2013). 
Furthermore, Kant’s critical idealism encourages us to “act as if there is a world” 
(Gaston 2013, 16 and 24). This call forms a central paradox embedded in the Kantian 
definition of “pragmatic anthropology”. It is rooted to the multiple meanings given to the 
term “world”, depending on the context in which the term is used. The term “world” can be 
roughly contained in two basic concepts: one referring to “the world” [die Welt]; and the 
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other to “a world” [ein Welt] (Gaston 2013, 27). The world refers to the sensuous and 
material world history. On the other hand, a world refers to an intelligible Idea of imagining 
the world as an object. The double conceptual meaning given to the “world” sets the project 
of anthropology in-between two worlds: on the one hand, the pragmatic world of everyday 
life (content), and on the other, a transcendental and imagined world as an object (form), rich 
in universal ideals that contemplate a better future for humanity. The world and a world are 
aesthetically distinguished in terms of content and form respectively. This follows Aristotle’s 
classic separation of form from content in his Poetics [335BC], which were developed by 
Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason.  The study of “Aesthetics” was succeeded by his 
subsequent examination of form without content in the Critique of Practical Reason, and 
concluded with his examination of form as an aesthetic end in itself in the Critique of 
Judgement (Eagleton 1990, 121). Paradoxically, the form of a world and the content of the 
world is, in the words of Adorno, “an autonomous entity and a social fact” (2008, 362, my 
emphasis). Kant’s critical idealism engages the form of a world, referring to its esoteric, 
aesthetic, collective, and universal qualities, all of which support its autonomy as the Idea of 
a world-object, with the content of world history and geography, referring to the social, 
political, and historical aspects of such a representation, or in Kant’s terms, its pragmatic 
aspects. Therefore, Kantian anthropology forms a practical application of this discourse, as it 
encourages to moving away from a purely philosophical discourse about a world, and a 
purely practical discourse about the world (anthropology as a vocation). Instead, it promotes 
the complementary study of form (aesthetics) and content (science) towards a dialectical 
appreciation of the world as a whole in its complete form and content. In other words, Kant’s 
transcendental reunion with the “world” is not used “to refer to some realm beyond the 
phenomenal world, but to indicate the conditions of possibility for experiencing it” (Bell 
1999, 19, my emphasis, and in Walsh 1975). In this context, travelling becomes the means of 
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connecting each world citizen to the wholeness of the world, opening up the possibilities of a 
better world through communication. Accordingly, “the form of the world is a real 
connection […] because it is a real whole” (Kant cited by Gaston 2013, 5).  
In sum, the above section highlighted the defining characteristics of Kantian 
anthropology through its central paradox, the existence of two “worlds”. First, the 
teleological and moral aspect of Kantian thought of an ideal future utopia is set against the 
dystopia of history, which conforms to the separation of the content of “the world” from the 
form of “a world”, in terms of the “lower” and “higher” realms in the history human thought. 
Second, I discussed Kantian anthropology as a type of practical (i.e. “pragmatic”) judgement, 
referring to a specific way of thinking in which the particular is enabled to communicate with 
the universal in a twofold manner: a “determinative” way, i.e. local knowledge tested under a 
priori universal laws, and vice versa, a “merely reflective” way, i.e. the universal law tested 
according to a particular local or personal reality (as in Allison 2001, 15). And third, I 
highlighted the definition of the Kantian anthropological project as a pragmatic negotiation 
with an emerging history-on-the-making, open to potentiality to create a better world, free 
from inequality and war; to fulfil the Dream of the Child for World Peace. Since for Kant the 
project of anthropology is a type of “pragmatic” Judgement, on the basis of which human 
relations and networks are built, and since the essence of Judgement is defined by Taste, it 
follows that the paradox of Kant’s pragmatic idealism is elevated to a methodological 
problem regarding the politics of representation and the gap between the anthropological 







Questions regarding the Autonomy of Common Sense 
For Kant, the anthropological project was set to be a mediator between the universally 
familiar and the exotically strange. It was meant to break away from the burden of nationalist 
histories, in order to pave the way for imagining a unified world as a form, and in respect to 
its content. In such a way, travelling or reading would contribute to closing the gap between 
the particular and the universal, through the personal experiences gained during a journey, be 
it geographical or artistic. This extrovert move to the world would ideally open channels of 
communication beyond the constraints set by borders and ideologies. Therefore, the key to 
understanding Kant’s anthropological project is communicability, and “the standard of 
deciding about it is common sense” (Arendt 1982, 69, my emphasis). Accordingly, the 
development of a “world society as a vocation” requires us to “rely on personal judgment 
moderated by common sense, in the double meaning of shared intelligence and taste” (Hart 
2003, 1). However, the idea of a common sense represents an enigma in Kant’s writings, 
particularly when related to universal ideas. This did not pass without a notice to Kant, who 
wonders: 
 
The necessity of the universal assent that is thought in a judgement of taste, is a subjective 
necessity which, under the presupposition of a common sense, is represented as objective 
[…] does such common sense in fact exist as a constitutive principle of the possibility of 
experience, or is it formed for us as a regulative principle by a still higher principle of 
reason, that for higher ends first seeks to beget in us a common sense? Is taste, in other 
words, a natural and original faculty, or is it only the idea of one that is artificial and to be 
acquired by us, so that a judgement of taste, with its demand for universal assent, is but a 





The enigma of a common sense poses a direct problem to the necessity for communicability. 
Alfred Schutz (1967) has shown that the idea of a common sense is in itself a matter of 
mutual agreement-in the Durkheimian sense of the collective consciousness: “All our 
knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as scientific thinking, involved constructs, 
i.e. a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the 
respective level of thought organization” (Schutz 1967a, 5). For Schutz, the inter-subjective 
character of social reality is constructed on the basis of “reciprocity of perspectives” between 
subjective knowledge and personal experience, against the subjectivity of the objectified 
collective consciousness and social origins of common sense knowledge (ibid.  11-17). The 
ambiguity inherited in the idea of a common sense undermines the ability and necessity of 
communication between the particular and the universal. This problem is particularly evident 
when our “common sense” is juxtaposed to an-Other, non-familiar, untranslatable, and exotic 
Otherness. In other words, the basis of a common sense reduces reality to a presentation of 
so-called “universal” ideals, limiting them to interpretations that carry the burden of the 
impossibility of translation, and convenience of interpretation, between various constructs of 
common senses against each other. It poses, therefore, a methodological, ethical, and political 
issue regarding the practice of ethnography in terms of how knowledge about the world is 
constructed, interpreted, evaluated, and by whom (see also Clanton’s chapter in this volume). 
In order to understand the enigma of common sense knowledge, we need to return to 
Kant’s investigation of Taste. Kant distinguishes the Aesthetic Judgement of Taste, on the 
basis that “it is independent of all interest”, from the Agreeable and the Good both of which 
serve “society” with a certain collective interest (Kant 1998, 79-83 [1790, paragraphs 2-4]). 
This separation conforms to the distinction of the “higher” (Platonic) a priori realm of the 
faculties of the mind, the source of the sense of Judgement and appreciation of Beauty, from 
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the “lower” material and sensual interests of everyday life. Furthermore, the autonomy of the 
free will carries a universal quality that is “present only to a free, disinterested, contemplative 
consciousness” (Gell 1999, 220-221). In these terms, the appreciation of Beauty refers to a 
taste of distinction, rather than that of necessity or interest, [see Kant’s definition of “beauty”, 
2000, 116-7 [1790, 5/232], and 2000, 11 [1790, 5/198], 44-46 [1793, 20/206], and 83 [1793, 
20/245]). This is confirmed by Kant’s separation of the “taste of reflection”, from the “taste 
of sense”, in terms of their respective ends. An artefact, such as the form of the world as an 
object of contemplation, is elevated to the “higher” realm of perception that sets it apart from 
any (practical) interest, because of its independent (a priori) aesthetical, universal, and 
teleological qualities; its “form of finality” in Hegel’s absolutist terms. 
In Hegel’s development of Kant’s idealism, the conception of the Beautiful must 
combine the “metaphysical universality with the determinateness of real particularity” in 
order to avoid being reduced to a narcissistic one-sided reflection (Hegel 1993, 25-26 [1764, 
section XXXVII). However, Hegel expands on Kant’s aesthetic theory in a passionate search 
for God and the Absolute. Following the classic separation of content from form, Hegel 
separates the Idea (concept, content) of art, from its given form (style) and the creative 
process of “the configuration of sensuous material”, in order to dialectically reunify them 
“into a free reconciled totality” (Hegel 1998, 97 [1835-8], my emphasis). Hegel’s 
reunification of a form (a world) and content (the world) builds into the absolutist Idea of a 
World (the “world picture” in Heidegger’s terms) excluding the material history of the world. 
Therefore, Hegel’s dialectical reunification of a fictional future world brings into Kant’s 
finality of Judgement the aesthetic politics of the Absolute. This form of absolutism 
embedded in the “pure aesthetic”, as it came to be known, is politically affine to 
totalitarianism. It is present in world history in a variety of forms of power, including 
colonialism and fascism. Accordingly, the total form of the world as an object of 
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contemplation, or the world picture, is a seemingly totalitarian image of the “real world” as 
disconnected from material history: “In the ‘imaginary’ of ideology, or of aesthetic taste, 
reality comes to seem totalized and purposive […] this is a finality only with respect to the 
subject’s faculty of cognition” (Eagleton 1990, 87, my emphasis). In this absolutist and a-
political context, the form of a world overrides the content of the world, conforming to an 
Image (imago) of a world without content, one that becomes an absolutist representation of 
the “modern world picture” in Heidegger’s terms (1977, 130).  
The attributed autonomy in Kant’s higher sense of aesthetic purity has been criticized 
by a number of scholars. Bourdieu (1984) argued that an artwork, be it an ethnography, not 
only carries its own specific social history and ideology, but it is a product of a particular set 
of conditions that define it as an “art” or “ethnography” in the first place. Elsewhere, Gell 
highlighted the connection of art to the social and everyday aspects of making art, 
particularly in respect to the technical processes that contribute to the formation of social 
relations (1999, 178-179). In this sense, the a-political autonomy of an anthropological 
monograph is itself ideologically manufactured and historically specific. Furthermore, the 
disconnection of the form of the world from its content, in terms of a particular “common 
sense”, contributes to an ideologically specific understanding of our place in the world. This 
understanding is enhanced by a power play between the observer (i.e. artist or ethnographer) 
and the object of interest (i.e. native or “informant”) in a process of objectifying the 
representation of reality (as in Grimshaw and Ravetz 2009). This process of dissociation 
echoes Bertolt Brecht’s “scientific” method of alienation in theatre. As in Brecht, it allows 
the seer to function from the point of view of a higher (a)-moral force. Equally, allegory 
enables the ethnographer to self-consciously describe and experience fieldwork-ing as a kind 
of “self-fashioning” that contributes to “the reconstitution of selves and others through 
specific exclusions, conventions, and discursive practices” (Clifford 1988, 52, and in 1986, 
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24-26, 98-121).  The distant, neo-romantic, ethnographic “innocent eye” in Grimshaw’s 
terms (2001, 45) is filled with childlike curiosity and playful indifference (Paganopoulos 
2013). But as Bourdieu famously stated: “The ‘eye’ is a product of history reproduced by 
education”. Accordingly, “the act of empathy, Einfuhlung, which is the art lover's pleasure, 
presupposes an act of cognition, a decoding operation, which implies the implementation of a 
cognitive acquirement, a cultural code” (Bourdieu 1984, 3). Bourdieu’s reminder reveals the 
affinity between the problem of autonomy of art and the “universal” claim of a particularly 
given common sense. 
 
The Problem of Universalism and History 
Inevitably, the above concerns regarding absolutist interpretations of Kant’s vision are 
directly linked to the politics of representation and issues of universalism and ethnocentrism 
in anthropology, which were raised following the “crisis of the intellectuals” in the 1960s, 
revealing a methodological and ethical gap between the idealism inherited in the 
anthropological vocation (a united world) and the content of its historical reality (see Asad 
1973 and 1993, Bourdieu 1977, Fabian 1983, Needham 1984, Pratt 1986, Herzfeld 1987, 
Clifford 1988, Grimshaw and Hart 1995, Katz and Csordas 2003, da Col and Graeber 2011, 
among many others). In a conference in 1971, held by the Association of Professional 
Anthropologists of the UK and the Commonwealth, Talal Asad argued that the idea of a 
common sense is related to the Eurocentric definition of universalism, an anthropological 
type of modern idealism that has been associated with a history of colonial exploitation, 
ethnocentrism, chrono-centrism, and ocular-centrism, each one presenting methodological, 
ethical, and ideological problems in relation to history and the perception of reality (Asad 
1973, 9-19, and 1993, 19). In the past, the dominant ethnocentric worldview contributed to 
the creation of semi-fictional, nostalgically imagined, exotic Other-worlds, whose 
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representation counter-supported the colonial and post-colonial establishments; worlds of 
shadows of interconnected Platonic Caves. These caves stood on the rocky cliffs of an 
ideological apparatus that a-historically associated modernity and science exclusively with 
the European Enlightenment. The historical and economic realities of colonialism, including 
slavery (see also Hutnyk and Sahasrabudhe in this volume) hijacked Kant’s dream of a better 
world by blocking the potentiality of his world vision with a distorted European 
understanding of history that enhanced the institutionalised so-called racial “superiority” of 
Us against Them. 
For many centuries, the ethnocentric universal perspective hid the power play 
“between dominating and dominated” (Asad 1973, 10). The historical association of 
anthropology with brutal colonialism and post-colonialism reduced the discipline into an 
alternative form of speculative history in the service of imperialist and post-imperialist 
interests (Asad 1973 and 1993, and in Fabian 1983, de Certeau 1988, Tambiah 1990, 
Grimshaw and Hart 1993 and 1995, Hutnyk 2004, among others). Travelling writers of the 
Victorian era, followed by the writings of early twentieth century professional 
anthropologists, imposed and confirmed the categories of “Western” and “Eastern” cultures, 
often in the same line with “modern” and “primitive”, eponymous and anonymous, 
individualistic and collective, scientific and superstitious, respectively. This a-historical 
assertion associated the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, which included the birth of the 
Humanities, exclusively with Europe and the European Enlightenment. And yet, Jack Goody 
(2010) convincingly argued that in the human history there have been several Renaissances 
that took place around the world at about the same time with the Italian Renaissance and the 
rise of the humanist studies (studia humanores). Goody pointed to the historical fact that the 
values of tolerance, charity, and individualism, all of which had been exclusively associated 
with Europe, were spread throughout the Near East, as well as, in India and China at the same 
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time with the Italian Renaissance (2010, 87-88). Consequently, the a-historical association of 
Renaissance only with Europe raises questions regarding the validity of the European 
exclusive claim to science and modernity. 
Tambiah (1990) and Asad (1993) further discussed that the exclusive claim of 
Europeans to modernity and science was integral in supporting and being supported by the 
wider ideological and economic apparatuses of colonial and post-colonial elites. In this 
context, Michel de Certeau deconstructed the European discourse of rewriting history from 
the colonialist perspective through a circular categorization (mapping) of the world, one 
which ideologically separated Christians from non-Christians. Michel de Certeau highlighted 
the process of erasing and rewriting history on the grounds of an invented colonialist 
“raisonne of knowledge”. This was counter- constructed in an ideological opposition to the 
hermeneutics of the “Other”, on the basis of “Our” domination over the “Other” (1988, 212- 
225). The reconstruction of history opened a rift in time, which was manifested as a 
confounded silence in the ethnographic text: a “silence that shapes the traditional 
ethnographic project of trying to describe the culture as it was before Western intervention” 
(Pratt 1986, 41-42, and in this volume see Clanton, Kucza, and Schmitz).  This void exposed 
the romantic nostalgia associated with the birth of modern anthropology and its obsession 
with the “noble savage”. Herzfeld (1987) paralleled this modernist fantasy to the Biblical 
return to the “pure” state of Adam and Eve, the two mythical and eternal archetypes without 
history who lived in a pure and perfect existence before their Fall into material history (1987, 
30-9). Fabian (1983) further investigated the effect of “allochronism”, by which term he 
referred to the systematic dislocation of a culture from history, as if it is an extracted exhibit 
in a museum, which conformed to “our” perception of modernity and “our” distinction from 
“their” mythical and eternal time, a distinction that critically contributed to the subordination 
and categorization of non-European “Others” to the Christian European world. 
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In all the above criticisms, anthropology is seen as an alternative type of 
historiography associated closely with a particular colonialist “raisonne of knowledge” (de 
Certeau 1988). In this context, the blend of a variety of historical narrative genres (such as 
historical fiction, travelling writing, autobiography, the monograph, romance, the historical 
novel, or the swashbuckling tale) represents a dilemma that takes us back to Kant’s paradox 
and the double meaning of “the world” and “a world”. On the one hand, the close relationship 
between history and the novel encompasses the danger of historicity in contributing to a 
distorted representation of the world, in an accessible “betwixt and between” style of today 
(Hutcheon 1988, 111-114). The parallel histories of the birth of professional anthropology 
and the history of colonialism illustrate this danger, echoing Plato’s play of shadows in the 
Cave that distort true perception, conforming instead to the dominant apparatus that 
commissioned its writing in the first place, that of the European Christian colonizer. But on 
the other hand, the premise of Kantian anthropology to rewrite an alternative world history, 
one that is based on tolerance, imagination, and mutual understanding, enables the political 
potentiality to open up the channels of communication, the “poetics of relation” in Glissant’s 
terms (2010), which would revitalize and reinvent the anthropological vocation and its 
emphasis on human nature, but under a different set of terms and aims than that of the 
fictional “West”. Accordingly, the opening of the ethnographic scope to the world would 
contribute to the creation of an equal and free world society in the Kantian spirit of practical 
philosophy. 
 
The Rise of World Society and Inequality 
Nowadays, Kant’s vision of a unified world is more relevant than ever. We are living 
in a great moment of transition from the local to the global, enhanced by the rapid 
development of network and digital technologies, all of which contribute to the emergence of 
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a collective sense of belonging to a newly unified world, beyond the walls of old regimes and 
nation states, making each one of us feel as world citizens. The rapid “rise of the network 
society” (Castells 2010) enables the world citizen to be active and engage with the lives of 
others. In the spirit of Kant, the personal lives (local realm) is directly connected with the 
world (universal realm) in both determinative (from the universal to the particular) and 
merely reflective (from the particular to the universal) ways. The revolution in 
communications and spontaneous creation of horizontal networks further contribute to the 
continuous (r)evolution of our “world society”, referring to “the totality of social 
relationships linking the inhabitants of earth” from agrarian to modern times (Hart 2002, 22-
35, and 2003). The rise of the network society enables free access to the small worlds of 
individuals, uncensored ideas, and point of views from across the globe, enhancing our 
collective sense of constant movement, echoing the waves of a sea of data. This new world 
society is constantly renovated by the introduction of cheap and accessible network 
technologies, which, when uncensored, give access to a number of points of views and a 
variety of perspectives from across the globe. In other words, they enhance a Copernican 
perspective of the world, containing the essence of the emancipating spirit of Freedom of 
Rousseau, Hume, and Kant, and enhancing the essence of communicability (Hart 2003, 
2004). 
But the waves of this ocean of endless stream of data are not calm and perpetually 
peaceful, but grow a stormy sea horizon in which information is tested, contested, negotiated, 
developed, accepted, or rejected. The juxtaposition of opposite point of views and histories 
cause tensions between (what is thought to be) “universal” and (what is thought to be) 
“local”. The multiplication of voices challenges the Absolute idea of Truth, but on the other 
side of the same coin, there is no single truth, nor substance. For our times are not times of 
perpetual peace. Our world is on fire. It is burning with injustice, poverty, intolerance, 
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inequality, conflict, the rise of ultra-nationalism and puritanism. It is a tempestuous world, 
increasingly out of control, unequal, and inaccessible. Amartya Sen (1992) extensively 
discussed how inherited forms of inequality, support further categorizations, on the basis of 
which more separations (and discriminations) are built: “[...] the importance of the distinction 
between seeking equality in different spaces relates ultimately to the nature of human 
diversity. It is because we are so deeply diverse, that equality in one space frequently leads to 
inequality in other spaces” (1992, 117). New culturally naturalized categories of the mind, 
based on existing established categorizations, in terms of class, gender, ethnicity, religion, 
economic status, political party, colour, political party, football team, car, house, profile, and 
style, are relentlessly born, reborn, evolving, revived, forgotten, mixed, fused, and discarded. 
Free access to it is limited to the few privileged. Perimeter protection has become the 
established way of thinking. The free-market Promised Paradise and Olympic Dreams are 
militarized. Racism has been institutionalized into a standard policy. New walls are built, 
excluding and criminalizing those who dare to cross them. Children are left helpless to die in 
no man’s land and sea. Humans become “illegals”, stereotyped into categories that have 
nothing to do with the everyday experience of poverty that affects the majority of world 
citizens.  In a world built on massive debt, the old and hateful ideals of purity are 
institutionalized, militarized, professionalized, and air-conditioned; for the entire world 
becomes increasingly cast-sized. Furthermore, while new technologies carry the ideal of an 
open democracy, their increasing censorship and surveillance challenge this promise. In a 
world stigmatized by terrorism, as well as, the marketed involvement of private co-operations 
in our private lives, the world citizens increasingly see their rights and freedoms bent, 
distorted, and finally, eliminated (Morozov 2011, and Horst and Miller 2012). 
The continuous introduction of digital technologies has revolutionized our 
“worldview” [Weltanschauung] of what Heidegger called the “world picture” (1977). For 
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Heidegger, the knowledge about the world is contained in a representation of the “world” as a 
picture [Bild]. The “world view” of the world as a picture [Bild] “now means the structured 
image [Gebild] that is the creature of man’s producing which represents and sets before” 
(Heidegger 1977, 134). In other words, the “world view” contains the essence and values of 
the structures and ideological mechanisms that produce it, becoming reality in itself. More 
specifically, as Tiwary discusses in this volume in relation to the films of Jia Zhang-ke, the 
rise of virtual reality crossed the lines between the real and the imaginary in a variety of ways 
(Baudrillard 1988, Foster 1996). Baudrillard famously argued that in our times the 
representation of the form of the world does not simply take place in terms of imitation, as it 
was traditionally defined in the Greek philosophy of poetics in terms of mimesis (Plato, 
Aristotle), but rather, it becomes reality in itself, a process he called the “hyper-real”. The 
world becomes a postmodern Disneyland, referring to an elliptical representation of the 
image of Heidegger’s “world picture”, one that conceals more than it reveals, “in order to 
make us believe that the rest is real” (Baudrillard 1988, 172, and in this volume Tiwary). In a 
political sense, the simulacrum of the world-picture becomes the true picture of the “world”, 
whose representation gains a political and historical weight: “The simulacrum is never that 
which conceals the truth-it is the truth which conceals that there is none. The simulacrum is 
true” (from the Greek tragedy Ecclesiastes cited by Baudrillard 1988, 166). The great 
paradox, therefore, is that while technology brings us closer by enhancing our feeling of 
world citizenship and sense of freedom, at the same time, it also contributes to our alienation 
from ourselves and from the real world out there. We become indifferent, inactive, inhuman, 
isolated, stuck in front of a computer screen and a mobile phone, and lost in a sea of co-
operative personalized information. This ellipsis is our reality that defines the illusion of who 
we think we are. 
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And yet, the real world is out there, as it is inside us. By experiencing it, we discover 
ourselves. We are defined by our personal odyssey, inwards the self, and outwards towards 
the world, motivated by our shared sentiment for Freedom and Justice. These are the a priori 
values that make us Human: the vain search for God, the loss of our beloved Ithaca. Our 
historical moment is a moment of a great transition towards the world society, one that is 
based on self-realization and open communication and a radical change in our ways of 
thinking. We live in the liminal times of a great transformation, a collective rite of passage to 
a new human consciousness. In spite the hurdles imposed by the economic elites and their 
supportive institutions, the introduction of cheap network technologies offer the potentiality, 
if not the opportunity, to grasp history and make it happen. This opportunity then inevitably 
raises questions over the role, relevance, and responsibility of anthropology to the formation 
of the world society. How can anthropologists remain indifferent to inequality and irrelevant 
to this great moment of history? Can the anthropological discourse practically contribute to 
this emerging consciousness and the inevitable transition to a new world society? 
 
Poetics and Return of the Auteur 
The term “poetics” derives from the Greek word “poio”, which is translated as “to 
make”. Plato and Aristotle referred to “poetics” in terms of mimesis (i.e. imitation/ 
representation of reality). In the Republic, Plato [380BC] approached poetry as sensual and 
distorted, and therefore, a dangerous mimesis of reality because of the inherited enthusiasm of 
poetic speech (“inspiration”). For Plato, the poetic allegory has the capacity to deceive and 
manipulate by enhancing false transcendental experiences. Plato criticised poetic 
transcendentalism for its propaganda ends in the hands of the ruling elites and its power to 
enchant the masses through storytelling (Murray 1996, 23); the Shadows of Plato’s Cave.  
For Plato, poetic expressionism hides away the ultimate Truth, which can be only found in 
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the Sun that blinds the eye. In this sense, Plato proposed the replacement of poetry with 
philosophy, which would ideally clear away the Shadows of the mind with the blinding Light 
of the Sun. In contrast to Plato’s transcendentalism, Aristotle’s Poetics [335BC] studied 
poetry in terms of genres of recitation, specific formats, styles, narrative structures, the 
structure of verse and prose (rhythm, tone, structure, form and content). Aristotle approached 
poetics and poetry from an educational perspective, highlighting the moral and self-reflective 
aspect of the poetic word as an imitation of reality. Most importantly, Aristotle distinguished 
poetry from history in terms of their “universal truths” and “particular statements”, 
respectively. Plato’s and Aristotle’s separation of poetry from history, in terms of fiction and 
non-fiction, takes us back to the discussion regarding the politics of representation. 
Similar to Kant, Aristotle highlighted the potentiality of poetry to open up to the 
probability of future events, new worlds and ideas (Aristotle 2013, 28). However, in Kant the 
potential force of the poetic metaphor is not reducible to an a-political and a-historical 
mimesis of reality, but rather, should pave the way to investigating the universal aspects of 
world history and the human nature in a complementary way: for “the truth of metaphor is 
not in what it contains but in the possibilities it suggests” (Papastergiadis 1993, 18, my 
emphasis). It could be argued, therefore, that the essence of the anthropological vocation is 
the poetic metaphor and the possibilities it suggests. This directly relates to Clifford’s 
discussion regarding the “poetic dimensions” (“plural poesis”) of the ethnographic text (1986 
and 1988). Here, therefore, ethnography is equated to poetry and art, and in complementary 
ways forms “a system of action, intended to change the world rather than to encode symbolic 
proportions about it” (as in Gell 1998, 6, my emphasis). In similar terms, the philosopher 
Cesare Casarino introduced the term Philopoesis as: “the love of the potentiality that cuts 
across philosophy and literature–and this is a potentiality that makes itself manifest 
specifically in writing […] it is above all the love of that which remains unmade” (2002, 
28 
 
xxvi). The silence of the unmade future history opens up the space to a range of possibilities 
(i.e. “potentia”) for an active remaking of the world, allowing the engagement of our self in 
the world through our imagination. 
The philosopher Jacques Rancière has argued that the power of the Word is more than 
a literary mimesis of reality. In the spirit of the Enlightenment, Rancière gives to the Word 
political power, manifested as “the very Spirit that bears words to prove itself by becoming 
living flesh” (2004a, 6). For Rancière, the dichotomy between what is thought to be real and 
what is thought to be fiction, the grey area in-between logos (what is said) and pathos (what 
is felt), contains the political and ideological enforcements of perceiving what we call 
“reality” and “history”. In this context, the modernist dichotomy between fiction and non-
fiction is in itself fictional. It is, therefore, in the grey area in-between the logos and pathos 
that history takes place within the ambiguous space of representation in itself, in-between the 
liminal space of the perceptions of the self and the world, the familiar and the unfamiliar, 
exoticism and reality. It is a play set in-between: “the politics founded on the play of 
exchanges and displacements between the art world and that of non-art” (Rancière 2004b: 
51). Such a play culminates to the reproduction of history-(ies) as political fictions, formed 
and performed in the grey area in-between reality and fiction. Rancière illustrated the power 
of the Word by proposing a fragmented style of historical narration set in-between fiction and 
non-fiction as a reflection upon history itself, and most importantly, as the means of making 
history: 
 
‘History’ is only made up of stories that we tell ourselves, but simply that the “logic of 
stories” and the ability to act as historical agents go together. Politics and art, like forms of 
knowledge, construct ‘fictions’, that is to say material rearrangements of signs and images, 
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relationships between what is seen and what is said, between what is done and what can be 
done (Rancière 2006, 39) 
 
Rancière’s appropriation of a history on-the-making returns to Kant’s engagement 
with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s emancipating idea of Freedom, one that “demands 
creativeness, invention, imagination” (Lindsay 1934, ix). Furthermore, it responds to the 
universal instinct that motivates all human intention towards the “ultimate” (i.e. teleological) 
and “higher” achievement of Equality. Only a free world citizen can make the world a 
homely place by bringing the world closer (as in Hart 2003 and 2004). Following David 
Hume’s criticism of institutionalized religion, the emancipating intention towards Freedom 
would ideally transgress the “appearances” of established theocratic institutions, nation-
states, borders, ideologies, and their regimes, in order to open towards the potentiality to 
break free from the burden of an ethnocentric perception of history and its supportive 
ideological apparatuses. Kant expressed this idealism in his pair of essays written on the 
“Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent” [1784] and “To Perpetual peace: A 
Philosophical Sketch” [1795]. The spirit of the pair of essays comes to life in terms of the 
greater (i.e. “higher”) responsibility of humanity as a whole to achieve the conditions for 
perpetual and universal peace. In this light, Kant’s anthropological project would ideally 
expand beyond history and literature, towards the creation of an emerging “historical 
consciousness” (as in Laura Marcus 1994, 135-161, and Bakhtin 1981, 5, 11-12). This term 
was originally coined by Wilhelm Dilthey’s [1833-1911] in reference to the collage of 
personal experiences and collective memories that constitute an emerging “subjective 
consciousness”, a dynamic concept that preceded Durkheim’s sociology of the collective 
consciousness [1893] and Jung’s archetypal collective unconscious [1936]. 
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Fictional accounts of a semi-fictional “world” offer a number of advantages to the 
study of collective imaginations of the past and the future. They give the perspective of 
insider who, similar to charismatic prophets, is also seen to be an outsider, a paradoxical 
position that enables them to critically reflect upon the history and society of the author’s 
time and place. Furthermore, the study of fiction encourages the cultivation of empathy and 
curiosity as the means of understanding and communicating with the “Other”. These accounts 
also avoid the burden of translation and interpretation, either by directly adopting the 
terminology and language used in a particular place and time, or by visually representing the 
powerful perspective of an outsider -from the inside. The paradoxical position of 
anthropologists, that of “strangers” in their own home (Paganopoulos 2013), highlights an 
affinity between their role and that of charismatic auteurs, referring to the active agents of 
world history in the Weberian sense of “charisma” (1968). In this context, an enlightened 
anthropology would offer an alternative world history, one based on a type of critical 
idealism that is enhanced with travelling and sharing common experiences, reading and 
watching films, participating in collective experiences, voicing differences, the negotiation of 
which would contribute to an emerging historical consciousness. 
The return to the original vocation of anthropology would be emancipated from the 
burden of its historical association with colonialism. Furthermore, by promoting a 
Copernican way of looking at various aspects of the world through the eyes of others, and 
even through the life of objects, such a return would enhance the collective feeling of 
communicability, and consequently, would satisfy our natural sense of movement and 
change; in other words, our collective feeling of belonging to an ever-changing world society. 
The power of the metaphor to enhance the creation of connections in history and the future 
echoes Edouard Glissant’s term of “poetics of relation” (2010) in his study of alternative 
ways of telling and making history in the Caribbean, through a series of collective memories 
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and other subjective narratives that revealed the cross/cultural processes at work in the 
transformation of personal identities. Glissant’s monograph offered an alternative history of 
the processes of “creolization” through open communication. This is not a new aspect in 
anthropology. For example, Marcel Mauss’s (1950) reading of Malinowski’s kula exchange 
system amongst the Trobriand islanders revealed a history of exchange and communication 
between what was a-historically thought to be “isolated” islands. Controversially, Mauss’s 
reading of Malinowski’s system showed how trading and the importance of movement gave 
life to the sacred objects and artefacts that carried their own history and social life on the 
basis of movement. The poetic dimensions in these exemplary ethnographic works allow 
anthropology to regain its historical weight and to return to the idea of the ethnographer as a 
charismatic auteur. 
 
          Conclusion 
This essay highlighted the central paradox in Kantian anthropology, a pragmatic 
discourse based on imagination, which raises further questions regarding the role of 
anthropology in the future, particularly in relation to this great historical moment of the 
transition of the world picture from an unknown and alienating place to a familiar home, via a 
network of personalized technologies that take us inwards a deeper understanding of our 
place in the world. This connection does not only challenge our misconceptions and 
assumptions of the past, but also encourages to seeing the world with the senses of others by 
appropriating their subjectivity into ours. The conscious exchange of subjectivities between 
equal world citizens would contribute to our emerging collective and historical 
consciousness. This re-engagement of anthropology with history through fiction is above all a 
political call against the discipline’s historical association with colonialism. This call is 
emancipated from the European claim to universality and modernity, the sterile “social 
32 
 
science”, and its historical association with colonialism. Instead, it promotes the widening of 
the ethnographic scope and historical awareness for both the auteur and the reader/spectator, 
in accordance to the changes taking place in world history. It responds to the question of how 
can anthropology, perceived as a practice and a way of thinking about the world, contribute 
to this historical moment and the emerging consciousness as a result of the transition to a 
world society. It reconnects anthropology to its counterpart, the study of history, beyond 
fictional and non-fictional categorizations. This return to authorship opens the possibility to 
promote an anthropology that is not only historically aware of its own past, but above all, one 
that offers hope and a vision of a better future for humanity as a whole; one that fulfils the 



















Adorno, Theodor. “Aesthetic Theory” in Aesthetics: A Comprehensive Anthology. Edited by 
Steven M. Cahn and Aaron Meskin. 358-369. Malden, Oxford, and Victoria: Blackwell 
Publishing. 2008. 
Allison, Henry E. Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. 
Cambridge, New York et al.: Cambridge University Press. 2001. 
Appadurai, Arjun, and Breckenridge, Carol. “Public modernity in India” in Consuming 
Modernity: Public Culture in a South Asian World. Edited by Carol Breckenridge. 1-20. 
Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press. 1995. 
Ardener, Edwin. “The New Anthropology and its Critics.” In MAN 6, no.3, (1971): 449-467. 
Arendt, Hannah. Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. Edited by Ronald Beiner. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 1982. 
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
1998 [1958]. 
Aristotle. Poetics. Edited & translated by Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
1996 [350BC]. 
Asad, Talal. Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter New Jersey: Humanity Books. 1973.  
Asad, Talal. Genealogies of Religion Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1993. 
Bakhtin, Mikhail. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Edited by Michael Holquist. 
Austin: University of Texas Press. 1981. 
Bakhtin, Mikhail. Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics. Edited and Translated by Caryl 
Emerson. Minneapolis and London: University of Minneapolis Press. 1984. 
Baudrillard, Jean. “Simulacra and Simulations” in Selected Writings. Edited by Mark Foster. 
166-184. Oxford: Polity Prtess. 1988. 
34 
 
Bell, Michael. “The metaphysics of Modernism” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Modernism. Edited by Michael Levenson. 9-32. Cambridge; New York; Melbourne, Madrid, 
Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi: Cambridge University Press. 1999. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge University Press, 1977. 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Translated 
by Richard Nice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Casarino, Cesare. Modernity at Sea: Melville, Marx, Conrad in Crisis. In Theory Out of 
Bounds Series Volume 21. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 2002. 
Castells, Manuel. The Rise of the Network Society. 2nd edition. Malden; Oxford; West Sussex: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 2010. 
Marcus, George E., and Clifford, James. Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography Berkeley: University of California Press. 1986.  
Clifford, James. “On Ethnographic Allegory” in Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography. Edited by George Marcus and James Clifford. 98-121. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 1986. 
Clifford, James. The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature 
and Art. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1988. 
da Col, Giovanni, and Graeber, David. “Foreword: The Return of Ethnographic Theory” in 
HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 1, No1 (2011): vi-xxxv. 
de Certeau, Michel. The Writing of History. Translated by Tom Conley. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 1988 [1975]. 
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding. Translated by R. 
M. Zaner and K. L. Heiges, with an introduction by R.A. Makkreel, The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhof. 1977 [1894]. 
35 
 
Durkheim, Emile. The Division of Labor in Society. Translated by W. D. Halls, with an 
introduction by Lewis A. Coser. New York: The Free Press. 1984 [1893].  
Eagleton, Terry. The Ideology of the Aesthetic. Oxford and Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell.  
1990. 
Fabian, Johannnes. Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 1983. 
Firth, Raymond. “Introduction” in A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term. XI-XXXI. 
London: The Athlone Press, 1967. 
Foster, Hal. The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the end of the century. Cambridge; 
Massachusetts; London: MIT, 1996. 
Gaston, Sean. The Concept of World from Kant to Derrida. London and New York: Rowman 
and Littlefield. 2013. 
Gell, Alfred. Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1998. 
Gell, Alfred. The Art of Anthropology: Essays and Diagrams in LSE Monographs in Social 
Anthropology Volume 67. Edited by Eric Hirsch. Oxford and New York: Berg. 2006. 
Glissant, Edouard. Poetics of Relation. Translated by Betsy Wing. The University of 
Michigan Press. 1997. 
Goody, Jack. Renaissances: The One or the Many? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
2010. 
Grimshaw, Anna. The Ethnographer’s Eye: Ways of seeing in anthropology Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 2001. 
Grimshaw, Anna, and Hart, Keith. Anthropology and the Crisis of Intellectuals Cambridge: 
Prickly Pear Press. 1993. 
36 
 
Grimshaw Anna, and Hart, Keith. “The Rise and fall of Scientific Ethnography” in The 
Future of Anthropology: Its Relevance to the Contemporary World. Edited by Akbar Ahmed 
and Chris Shore. 46-64. London: Athlone. 1995. 
Hammersley, Martyn. What’s wrong with Ethnography? Methodological Explorations. 
London and New York: Routledge, 1992. 
Hart, Keith. “World Society as an Old Regime” in Elite Cultures: Anthropological 
Perspectives. Edited by Cris Shore and Stephen Nugent. 22-36. London and New York: 
Routledge. 2002. 
Hart, Keith. “Studying World Society as a Vocation”. Lecture in Honour of Professor Brian 
Morris Goldsmiths College, London, 15th January 2003, Issue 9 of GARP, London: 
Goldsmiths. 2003. 
Hart, Keith. “Notes towards an anthropology of the internet” in Horizontes Anthropologicos 
Vol.10, no21, Porto Alegre [Jan/June 2004] http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0104-
71832004000100002 . 
Hegel, G.W.F. Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics. Edited by Michael Inwood. Translated by 
Bernard Bosanquet. London; New York et al. Penguin Books. 1993 [1886]. 
Hegel, G.W.F. “Philosophy of Fine Art.” In The Art of Art History: A Critical Anthology. 
Edited by Donald Preziosi. 80-88. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 2009a 
[1835-8]. 
Heidegger, Martin. “The Age of the World Picture”. The Question of Technology and other 
essays. Edited by W. Lovitt. New York: Harper and Row. 1977. 
Herzfeld, Michael. Anthropology through the Looking Glass: Critical Ethnography in the 
Margins of Europe. Cambridge University Press. 1987. 
Herzfeld, Michael. Anthropology: Theoretical Practice in Culture and Society. Malden, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 2001. 
37 
 
Horst, Heather, and Miller, Daniel. Digital Anthropology. London; New Delhi; New York 
and Sydney: Bloomsbury. 2012. 
Hume, David. [1739-40] Treatise of Human Nature http://davidhume.org/ 
Hume, David. [1748] An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding http://davidhume.org/ 
Hutcheon, Linda. A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction. New York and 
London: Routledge. 1988. 
Hutnyk, John. Bad Marxism: Capitalism and Cultural Studies London: Pluto. 2004. 
Jung, Carl Gustav. The Collected Works of C. G. Jung Volume 9, Part I: The Archetypes and 
the Collective Unconscious Translated by R. F. C. Hull, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
1968 [1936]. 
Kant, Immanuel. Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. Edited by H. Rudmick, and 
translated by V.L. Dowdell. Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern University Press 1978 
[1776-1800]. 
Kant, Immanuel. “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent” [1784] and “To 
Perpetual peace: A Philosophical Sketch” [1795] in Perpetual Peace and other essays on 
Politics, History, Morals. Edited and Translated by in T. Hymphrey. Indianapolis and 
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. 1983. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited by V. Politis. London and Vermont: 
Everyman 1993 [1781-1788]. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Edited and translated by M. Gregor. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997 [1788]. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgement. Edited by P. Guyer, and translated by 




Kant, Immanuel. Anthropology, History, and Education G. Zoller, and R. Louden (eds.) 
Cambridge; New York; Melbourne et al.: Cambridge University Press. 2007. 
Kant, Immanuel. “The Critique of Judgement.” In The Art of Art History: A Critical 
Anthology. Edited by Donald Preziosi. 62-79. Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press. 2009a [1790]. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement. Edited by N. Walker, and translated by J.C. 
Meredith. Oxford; New York et al.: Oxford University Press. (2009b) [1790]. 
Kant, Immanuel. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other 
Writings. Edited by Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University 
Press. 2011. 
Katz, Jack, and Csordas, Thomas.  “Phenomenological Ethnography in Sociology and 
Anthropology” in Ethnography 4 (2003): 275-288. 
Leach, Edmund. Rethinking Anthropology. London: Robert Cunningham and Sons Ltd, 1961. 
Levin, David Michael K. Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 1993. 
Levinas, Emmanuel. Humanism of the Other. Translated by Nidra Poller. Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2006 [1972].   
Lindsay, A.D. “Introduction” in Critique of Pure Reason. London: J. M. Dent and Sons, and 
New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1934 
Malinowski, Bronislaw. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1978 [1922]. 
Malinowski, Bronislaw. A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term. Translated by N. Guterman 
London: The Athlone Press, 1967. 
Marcus, George .E. and Clifford, James. Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. 
39 
 
Marcus, Laura. Auto/biographical Discourses: Criticism, Theory, Practice. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 1994. 
Mauss, Marcel. The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. 
Translated by H. D. Halls. Oxon: Routledge. 1990 [1950].  
Morozov, Evgeny. The Net Delusion: How Not to Liberate the World. London; New York 
and Toronto: Penguin/Allen Lane. 2011. 
Murray Plato. On Poetry. Edited by Penelope Murray Cambridge; New York; Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press. 1996. 
Needham, Rodney. “The Future of Anthropology: Disintegration or Metamorphosis?” in 
Anniversary Contributions to Anthropology: Twelve Essays. Edited by P.E. de Josseline de 
Jong, J. Van Baal, J.W. Locher, and J.W. Schoorl. 34-47. Leiden: Brill, 1970. 
Needham, Rodney. “The Birth of the Meaningful.” In Times Literary Supplement April 13 
(1984): 393. 
Paganopoulos, Michelangelo. “The Changing world of Satyajit Ray: Reflections on 
Anthropology and History” in Media Watch 4, no1 Special Issue: 100 Years of Indian 
Cinema (January 2013): 4-27. 
Paganopoulos, Michelangelo. “The Archetype of Transformation in the Films of Maya 
Deren” in Jung and Film II: The Return. Edited by Christopher Hauke and Luke Hockley. 
253-265. London and New York: Routledge. 2011. 
Papastergiadis, Nikos. (1993) Modernity as Exile: The Stranger in John Berger’s writing 
Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. 1993. 
Plato. Faidon: or of the Soul. Athens: Kaktos Literature Group. 1992. 
Plato. On Poetry. Edited by Penelope Murray. Cambridge; New York; Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press. 1996. 
40 
 
Pratt, Mary Louise. “Fieldwork in common places” in Writing Culture: The Poetics and 
Politics of Ethnography. Edited by George Marcus and James Clifford. 27-50. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 1986. 
Rancière, Jacques. The Flesh of Words: The Politics of Writing. Translated by C. Mandell. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2004(a). 
Rancière, Jacques. Aesthetics and its Discontents. Translated by Steven Corcoran. 
Cambridge: Polity. 2004(b). 
Rancière, Jacques. The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible. London: 
Continuum. 2006. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Basic Political Writings. Edited and Translated by Donald A. 
Cress Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett. 1987. 
Schutz, Alfred. “Common-Sense and scientific interpretation of human action” in Collected 
Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality. Edited by M. Natanson. 3-47. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff. 1967(a). 
Schutz, Alfred. The Phenomenology of the Social World. Translated by G. Walsh and F. 
Lehnert. US: Northwestern University Press. 1967(b). 
Sen, Amartya. Inequality Re-examined. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1992. 
Tambiah, Stanley Jeyaraja. Magic, science, Religion, and the scope of Rationality. 
Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press. 1990. 
Walsh, William Henry. Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 1975. 
Weber, Max. On Charisma and institution Building. Edited by S. N. Eisenstadt. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 1968. 
41 
 
Weber, Max. “Politics as a Vocation” & “Science as a Vocation” in From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology. Edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. 77-156. New York: 
Routledge. 2009 [1919]. 
